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Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information

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  • Gabriel Desgranges
  • Maik Heinemann

Abstract

This paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman-Stiglitz-Paradox is also given.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2004. "Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 35, Society for Computational Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf4:35
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gabriel Desgranges & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Roger Guesnerie, 2003. "Do Prices Transmit Rationally Expected Information?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 124-153, March.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    3. Guesnerie, Roger, 1992. "An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational-Expectations Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1254-1278, December.
    4. R. Guesnerie, 2002. "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 439-480, March.
    5. Maik Heinemann, 2003. "Are Rational Expectations Equilibria with Private Information Eductively Stable?," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 267, Society for Computational Economics.
    6. Maik Heinemann, 2002. "Existence of Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibria on Asset Markets with Asymmetric Information," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 57, Society for Computational Economics.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ingrid Ott & Susanne Soretz, 2006. "Governmental activity and private capital adjustment," Working Paper Series in Economics 26, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    2. Roger Guesnerie, 2009. "Macroeconomic and Monetary Policies from the Eductive Viewpoint," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 6, pages 171-202, Central Bank of Chile.
    3. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2007. "Expectational coordination in a class of economic models: Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587837, HAL.
    4. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
    5. Maik Heinemann, 2010. "Stability under learning of equilibria in financial markets with supply information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 383-391.
    6. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.
    7. Ingrid Ott & Susanne Soretz, 2006. "Nachhaltige Entwicklung durch endogeneUmweltwahrnehmung," Working Paper Series in Economics 24, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eductive Learning; Private Information; Informational Efficiency; Rational Expectations; Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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