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Are Rational Expectations Equilibria with Private Information Eductively Stable?

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  • Maik Heinemann
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    Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 with number 267.

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    Date of creation: 01 Aug 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf3:267

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    Related research

    Keywords: Rational expectations; Private information; Eductive stability;

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    References

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    1. R. Guesnerie, 2002. "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 439-480, March.
    2. Evans, George W. & Honkapohja, Seppo, 1999. "Learning dynamics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 449-542 Elsevier.
    3. Maik Heinemann, 2002. "Existence of Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibria on Asset Markets with Asymmetric Information," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics 57, Society for Computational Economics.
    4. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
    5. Evans George W. & Guesnerie Roger, 1993. "Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 632-646, October.
    6. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
    7. Guesnerie, Roger, 1992. "An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational-Expectations Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1254-78, December.
    8. Vives, X., 1990. "How Fast Do Rational Agents Learn?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 135-90, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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    Cited by:
    1. Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2005. "Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information," Working Paper Series in Economics 9, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.

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