Existence of Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibria on Asset Markets with Asymmetric Information
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 with number 57.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2002
Date of revision:
Learning; Asymmetric Information; Rational Expectations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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- Maik Heinemann, 2003. "Are Rational Expectations Equilibria with Private Information Eductively Stable?," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 267, Society for Computational Economics.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2008. "Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibria,Endogenous Acquisition of Information and the Grossman–Stiglitz Paradox," THEMA Working Papers 2008-25, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2004.
"Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2004
35, Society for Computational Economics.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2005. "Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information," Working Paper Series in Economics 9, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
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