Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Coordination on Saddle-Path Solutions: The Eductive Viewpoint -- Linear Multivariate Models

Contents:

Author Info

  • George W. Evans

    ()
    (University of Oregon Economics Department)

  • Roger Guesnerie

Abstract

We examine local strong rationality (LSR) in multivariate models with both forward-looking expectations and predetermined variables. Given hypothetical common knowledge restrictions that the dynamics will be close to those of a specified minimal state variable solution, we obtain eductive stability conditions for the solution to be LSR. In the saddlepoint stable case the saddle-path solution is LSR provided the model is structurally homogeneous across agents. However, the eductive stability conditions are strictly more demanding when heterogeneity is present, as can be expected in multisectoral models. Heterogeneity is thus a potentially important source of instability even in the saddlepoint stable case.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2003-28_Evans_Coordination_Saddle.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2003-28.

as in new window
Length: 26
Date of creation: 10 Oct 2003
Date of revision: 25 Jan 2005
Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2003-28

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1285 University of Oregon, 435 PLC, Eugene, OR 97403-1285
Phone: (541) 346-4661
Fax: (541) 346-1243
Email:
Web page: http://economics.uoregon.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Coordination; structural heterogeneity; strong rationality; eductive stability; multisectoral models;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bai, Yuting & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2013. "Infrequent Fiscal Stabilization," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-17, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  2. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2009. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts: concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substitutabilities," Working Papers halshs-00574957, HAL.
  3. George W. Evans & Roger Guesnerie & Bruce Mcgough, 2010. "Eductive stability in real business cycle models," Working Papers halshs-00565011, HAL.
  4. Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2008. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Working Papers halshs-00587863, HAL.
  5. Gliksberg, Baruch, 2010. "The Role of Consumption-Labor Complementarity as a Source of Macroeconomic Instability," MPRA Paper 24816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Gaballo, Gaetano, 2013. "Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 401-404.
  7. Mordecai Kurz, 2011. "Symposium: on the role of market belief in economic dynamics, an introduction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 189-204, June.
  8. Richard Dennis & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2013. "Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-611, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  9. Domenico Colucci & Vincenzo Valori, 2009. "Heterogeneous adaptive expectations and cobweb phenomena," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2009-01, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  10. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2003-28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bill Harbaugh).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.