Nonatomic Games with Limited Anonymity
AbstractAfter a brief survey of the literature about the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in the class of the nonatomic games, we prove the existence of an equilibrium in the class of the nonatomic games where the players' payoff depends over the average strategy of finitely many convex and disjoint subsets of players. Finally, several applications are shown, in the context of the economics of science and namely about the problem of the topic choice made by the set of the researchers, represented as a continuum.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 39.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2001
Date of revision: Nov 2001
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