P-Stable Equilibrium : Definition and Some Properties
AbstractWe define a continuous index of strategic stability,p.stability, which requires equilibrium to be the unique outcome compatible with common knowledge of rationality and common knowledge of p.beliefs (beliefs that put probability at least p on the equilibrium profile). We show that every equilibrium (within a large class) is p-stable for some p
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 952.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
common knowledge ; strategic uncertainty ; rationalizability. JEL Classification: C70 ; D84;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- rat - - - - - -
- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- Cla - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
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