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Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets

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Author Info

  • Geir B. , Asheim

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Voorneveld, Max

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • W. Weibull, Jörgen

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles,and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

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File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2010/Memo-01-2010.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 01/2010.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 07 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2010_001

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Email:
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Related research

Keywords: Epistemic game theory; epistemic stability; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief;

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References

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  1. Andreas Blume, 1996. "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Game Theory and Information 9604001, EconWPA.
  2. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2002. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-069/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. repec:fth:coluec:9596-22 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Tercieux, Olivier, 2006. "p-Best response set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 45-70, November.
  6. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
  7. Zambrano, Eduardo, 2008. "Epistemic conditions for rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 395-405, May.
  8. K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
  9. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  10. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1996. "A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1375-93, November.
  11. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  12. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  13. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
  14. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  15. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  16. DEMICHELIS, Stefano & RITZBERGER, Klaus, 2000. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," CORE Discussion Papers 2000059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Hurkens, Sjaak, 1996. "Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 186-197, April.
  18. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  19. Hu, Tai-Wei, 2007. "On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 379-391, September.
  20. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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