Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 69 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Hurkens, S., 1993. "Multi-Sided Pre-Play Communication By Burning Money," Papers 9319, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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