A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games
AbstractThis paper presents a new, probabilistic model of learning in games. The model is set in the usual repeated game framework but the two key assumptions are framed in terms of the likelihood of beliefs and actions conditional on the history of play. The first assumption formalizes the basic intuition of the learning approach; the second, the indeterminacy that inspired resort to learning models in the first place. Together the assumptions imply that, almost surely, play will remain almost always within one of the stage game's 'minimal inclusive sets.' In important classes of games, all such sets are singleton Nash. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 484.
Date of creation: 09 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-18 (All new papers)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997.
"Conditional Universal Consistency,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
471, David K. Levine.
- Bala, V. & Goyal, S., 1997. "Self-Organization in Communication Networks," Econometric Institute Research Papers, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute EI 9713-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
- S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel, 2010.
"A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
572, David K. Levine.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996. "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997.
- Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
- Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997.
"Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games,"
Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics
489, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Jansen, Mathijs & Vermeulen, Dries, 2001.
"Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 111-130, January.
- Balkenborg, D. & Jansen, M. & Vermeulen, D., 1998. "Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9806, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Brenner, Thomas & Witt, Ulrich, 2003. "Melioration learning in games with constant and frequency-dependent pay-offs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 429-448, April.
- Geir B. , Asheim & Voorneveld, Max & W. Weibull, Jörgen, 2009.
"Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets,"
Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics
01/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.