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Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations

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  • Forges, Francoise
  • Minelli, Enrico

Abstract

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 75 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 388-406

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:75:y:1997:i:2:p:388-406

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Cited by:
  1. E. Minelli & H. Polemarchakis, 2003. "Information at equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 573-584, 03.
  2. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies," Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales 2009-12, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  3. Heifetz, Aviad & Minelli, Enrico, 2002. "Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 197-218, September.
  4. BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Switching from complete to incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2005063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  6. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
  7. Lorenzo Rocco, 2001. "Nonatomic Games with Limited Anonymity," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics 39, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2001.
  8. Giraud, Gael, 2003. "Strategic market games: an introduction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 355-375, July.
  9. Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan, 2003. "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 421-431, July.

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