Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory
AbstractIt is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 3 (1982)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
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- Mamoru Kaneko, 1982. "The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: The Application to Monopoly and Oligopoly," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 614, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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- Kaneko, Mamoru, 1987.
"The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 93-128, April.
- Mamoru Kaneko, 1981. "The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 601, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
- Lorenzo Rocco, 2002.
"Anonymity in Nonatomic Games,"
53, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2002.
- Gaël GIRAUD & Sonia WEYERS, 2003. "Strategic Market Games with a Finite Horizon and Incomplete," Working Papers of BETA 2003-04, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Giraud, Gael & Stahn, Hubert, 2003. "Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 559-583, July.
- Berliant, Marcus, 2011. "Repeated Commuting," MPRA Paper 28979, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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