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The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments

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Kaneko, Mamoru

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 13 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 93-128
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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:13:y:1987:i:2:p:93-128

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
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  2. Gardner, Roy, 1977. "Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 513-517, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Donald Saari, 1989. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 819, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Akihiko Matsui, 1988. "Information Leakage Forces Cooperation," Discussion Papers 786, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Mamoru Kaneko, 1981. "Some Remarks on the Folk Theorem in Game Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 607, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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