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The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments

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  • Kaneko, Mamoru

Abstract

This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of the new concept is based on that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, or more precisely, rather on their interpretation of it which they call "standards of behavior." This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of Nash equilibrium. This paper provides the definition and considers the new solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of sexes and games with a continuum of players.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 13 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 93-128

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:13:y:1987:i:2:p:93-128

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
  3. Gardner, Roy, 1977. "Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 513-517, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Donald Saari, 1989. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 819, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Akihiko Matsui, 1988. "Information Leakage Forces Cooperation," Discussion Papers 786, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1982. "Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 281-290, October.

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