Some Remarks on the Folk Theorem in Game Theory
AbstractIt is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 607.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1981
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (1982), 3: 281-290
Note: CFP 562.
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- Kaneko, Mamoru, 1987.
"The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments,"
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Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 93-128, April.
- Mamoru Kaneko, 1981. "The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 601, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Mamoru Kaneko, 1982. "The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: The Application to Monopoly and Oligopoly," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 614, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Lorenzo Rocco, 2007.
"Anonymity in nonatomic games,"
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- Gaël GIRAUD & Sonia WEYERS, 2003. "Strategic Market Games with a Finite Horizon and Incomplete," Working Papers of BETA 2003-04, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Giraud, Gael & Stahn, Hubert, 2003. "Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 559-583, July.
- Berliant, Marcus, 2011. "Repeated Commuting," MPRA Paper 28979, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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