Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory
It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.
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- Mamoru Kaneko, 1982. "The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: The Application to Monopoly and Oligopoly," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 614, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
- Kaneko, Mamoru, 1987.
"The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 93-128, April.
- Mamoru Kaneko, 1981. "The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 601, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- R. J. Aumann & M. Maschler, 1972. "Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 54-63, January.
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