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An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games

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  • Robert W. Rosenthal

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/121.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 121.

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Date of creation: Sep 1975
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:121
Contact details of provider: Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Phone: 847/491-3527
Fax: 847/491-2530
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/Email:


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  1. R. J. Aumann & M. Maschler, 1972. "Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 54-63, January.
  2. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
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Cited by:

  1. Carmen Herrero, 1997. "Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 113-119.
  2. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "Induced Outcomes in Cooperative Normal-Form Games," Discussion Papers 178, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. van Damme, E.E.C., 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Other publications TiSEM b408f4e4-5094-48a1-a02f-5, School of Economics and Management.
  4. Barry O'Neill, 1982. "Comparison of Bargaining Solutions, Utilitarianism, and the Minimax Rule by their Effectiveness," Discussion Papers 521, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October.
  6. Jaume García Segarra & Miguel Ginés Vilar, 2011. "Weighted Proportional Losses Solution," ThE Papers 10/21, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..

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