The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments

Author Info

Mamoru Kaneko (University of Tsukuba)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Mamoru Kaneko

Abstract

This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of the new concept is based on that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, or more precisely, rather on their interpretation of it which they call "standards of behavior." This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of Nash equilibrium. This paper provides the definition and considers the new solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of sexes and games with a continuum of players.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 601.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1981
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:601

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Glena Ames).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Kaneko, Mamoru, 1987. "The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 93-128, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
Other versions:
- Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee. [Downloadable!]
Gardner, Roy, 1977. "Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 513-517, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Akihiko Matsui, 1988. "Information Leakage Forces Cooperation," Discussion Papers 786, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mamoru Kaneko, 1981. "Some Remarks on the Folk Theorem in Game Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 607, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Kaneko, Mamoru, 1982. "Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 281-290, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Donald Saari, 1989. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 819, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.