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Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring

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  • Josh Cherry
  • Lones Smith

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 814577000000000284.

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Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000284

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  1. Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January.
  2. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000079, www.najecon.org.
  3. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000367, David K. Levine.
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
  6. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1264, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
  8. Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-33, November.
  9. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
  10. Piccione, Michele, 2002. "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 70-83, January.
  11. FORGES, Françoise, . "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -721, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  13. Kenneth L. Judd & Sevin Yeltekin & James Conklin, 2003. "Computing Supergame Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1239-1254, 07.
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