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Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types

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  • Wagner, P.Achim
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    Abstract

    Abstract This paper studies unmediated communication with partially verifiable types in N-player games of incomplete information. I show that with five or more players, all outcomes that are feasible with the help of a mediator can also be achieved with direct communication between players if verifiable information can be encrypted. Without encryption, the set of equilibrium outcomes attainable with direct communication is generally strictly smaller than the set of mediated equilibrium outcomes, independent of the number of players in the game.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 99-107

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:99-107

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

    Related research

    Keywords: Bayesian game Unmediated communication Certification equilibrium;

    References

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    1. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
    2. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November.
    3. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    4. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
    6. F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    7. Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
    8. Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    9. Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.
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