Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions
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- Christian Ewerhart, 2017. "The lottery contest is a best-response potential game," ECON - Working Papers 242, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Mar 2017.
- Ori Haimanko, 2022.
"Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 27-39, May.
- Ori Haimanko, 2021. "Equilibrium Existence in Two-player Contests Without Absolute Continuity of Information," Working Papers 2106, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & David Lagziel, 2022.
"Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(1), pages 91-119, February.
- Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & David Lagziel, 2019. "Strong Robustness To Incomplete Information And The Uniqueness Of A Correlated Equilibrium," Working Papers 1901, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Communication; Collusion; All-pay auctions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2013-09-06 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2013-09-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-09-06 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2013-09-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-09-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-09-06 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-09-06 (Microeconomics)
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