Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A revealed preference test for weakly separable preferences

Contents:

Author Info

  • John Quah

Abstract

Consider a finite data set of price vectors and consumption bundles; under what conditions will there be a weakly separable utlity function that rationalizes the data?� This paper shows that rationalization in this sense is possible if and only if there exists a preference order on some finite set of consumption bundles that is consistent with the observations and that is weakly separable.� Since there can only be a finite number of preference orders on this set, the problem of rationalization with a weakly separable utility function is solvable.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/5768/paper601.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 601.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:601

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Afriat's theorem; Concave utility function; Budget set; Generalized axiom of revealed preference; Preorder;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2006. "Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets," Working Papers ubs0609, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
  2. Herbert E. Scarf & Ana Fostel & Michael J. Todd, 2004. "Two New Proofs of Afriat's Theorem," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm377, Yale School of Management.
  3. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2011. "Revealed preference tests for weak separability: an integer programming approach," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces11.25, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Alfred Galichon & John Quah, 2013. "Symposium on revealed preference analysis," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 419-423, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:601. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.