Nonzero-sum Stochastic Games
AbstractThis paper treats of stochastic games. We focus on nonzero-sum games and provide a detailed survey of selected recent results. In Section 1, we consider stochastic Markov games. A correlation of strategies of the players, involving ``public signals'', is described, and a correlated equilibrium theorem proved recently by Nowak and Raghavan for discounted stochastic games with general state space is presented. We also report an extension of this result to a class of undiscounted stochastic games, satisfying some uniform ergodicity condition. Stopping games are related to stochastic Markov games. In Section 2, we describe a version of Dynkin's game related to observation of a Markov process with random assignment mechanism of states to the players. Some recent contributions of the second author in this area are reported. The paper also contains a brief overview of the theory of nonzero-sum stochastic games and stopping games which is very far from being complete.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 19995.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision: 1999
average payoff stochastic games; correlated stationary equilibria; nonzero-sum games; stopping time; stopping games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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