An Application of Ramsey Theorem to stopping Games
AbstractWe prove that every two-player non zero-sum deterministic stopping game with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an e-equilibrium, for every e>0. The proof uses Ramsey Theorem that states that for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete infinite subgraph which is monochromatic.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 746.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 24 Jul 2001
Date of revision:
non zero-sum stopping games; Ramsey theorem; equilibrium payoff;
Other versions of this item:
- Shmaya, Eran & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 300-306, February.
- Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "An Application of Ramsey Theorem to Stopping Games," Discussion Papers 1323, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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- VIEILLE, Nicolas & SOLAN, Eilon, 2001.
"Quitting games - an example,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
747, HEC Paris.
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- Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan, 2002. "Two Player Non Zero-Sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time," Discussion Papers 1347, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002.
"Stopping games: recent results,"
- Eilon Solan, 2002. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Discussion Papers 1356, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Flesch, János & Kuipers, Jeroen & Schoenmakers, Gijs & Vrieze, Koos, 2008. "Subgame-Perfection in Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Recursive Payoffs," Research Memoranda 041, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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