This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Nicolas, VIEILLE ()
Eilon, SOLAN () (Kellogg School of Management)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff.

We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game terminates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than one.

We prove that a subgame-perfect e-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. If the game is not degenerate this e-equilibrium is actually in pure strategies.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hec.fr/var/fre/storage/original/application/7dc70a48fd44536dba056030e51a8039.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 772.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0772

Contact details of provider:
Postal: HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France
Web page: http://www.hec.fr/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Sandra Dupouy).

Related research
Keywords: n-player games; stopping games; subgame perfect equilibrium;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Janos Flesch & Frank Thuijsman & Koos Vrieze, 1997. "Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 303-314.
  2. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1999. "Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies," Discussion Papers 1258, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Quitting Games," Discussion Papers 1227, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan, 2002. "Two Player Non Zero-Sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time," Discussion Papers 1347, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mertens, J.-F., 1986. "Repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers 1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Working Papers hal-00242999_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Fine, Charles H. & Li, Lode, 1989. "Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 40-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Flesch, János & Kuipers, Jeroen & Schoenmakers, Gijs & Vrieze, Koos, 2008. "Subgame-Perfection in Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Recursive Payoffs," Research Memoranda 041, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, 2009. "Periodic stopping games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 169-181, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.