Stochastic Games with Information Lag
AbstractTwo-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces are known to have undiscounted values. We study such games under the assumption that one or both players observe the actions of their opponent after some time-dependent delay. We develop criteria for the rate of growth of the delay such that a player subject to such an information lag can still guarantee himself in the undiscounted game as much as he could have with perfect monitoring. We also demonstrate that the player in the Big Match with the absorbing action subject to information lags that grows too rapidly will not be able to guarantee as much as he could have in the game with perfect monitoring.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp499.
Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Abraham Neyman, 2001. "Real Algebraic Tools in Stochastic Games," Discussion Paper Series dp272, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Jean-Francois Mertens & Abraham Neyman & Dinah Rosenberg, 2007.
"Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces,"
843644000000000178, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Abraham Neyman, 2002. "Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax," Discussion Paper Series dp295, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 133-150, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ilan Nehama).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.