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Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces

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Author Info
Jean-Francois Mertens ()
Abraham Neyman ()
Dinah Rosenberg ()

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Abstract

We prove that games with absorbing states with compact action sets have a value.

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File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/dp/dp456.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp456.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp456

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Related research
Keywords: Games Stochastic Games Zero-sum Minimax Absorbing States Value

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 133-150, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Abraham Neyman, 2002. "Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax," Discussion Paper Series dp295, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-1.

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