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On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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Author Info
Dinah Rosenberg
Eilon Solan
Nicolas Vieille

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1344.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1344.

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Date of creation: Dec 2001
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1344

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eilon Solan & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signaling and Absorbing Games," Discussion Papers 1272, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Coulomb, Jean-Michel, 1992. "Repeated Games with Absorbing States and No Signals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 161-74.
  3. Lehrer, Ehud, 1992. "On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 211-26.
  4. Lehrer, E, 1990. "Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 191-217.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Vrieze, O J & Thuijsman, F, 1989. "On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 293-310.
  7. Lehrer, E, 1989. "Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 57-89.
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  1. Abraham Neyman, 2002. "Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax," Discussion Paper Series dp295, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
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