On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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Lehrer, Ehud

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Ehud Lehrer

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 20 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 211-26
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:211-26

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Mario Gilli, 1999. "Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(2), pages 472-485, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1344, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon, 2001. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Les Cahiers de Recherche 760, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
- Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the Max Min Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1337, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Working Papers hal-00242999_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
Mario Gilli, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2084, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Gilli, Mario, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 184-203, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000342, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 475-493, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John Hillas & Min Liu, 1996. "Repeated Games with Partial Monitoring: the Stochastic Signaling Case," Game Theory and Information 9605001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

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