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Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signaling and Absorbing Games

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  • Eilon Solan
  • Rakesh V. Vohra

Abstract

An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage. We prove that every n-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium. In other words, for every epsilon>0 there exits a probability distribution p (epsilon subscript) over the space of pure strategy profiles such that if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p (epsilon subscript) and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than epsilon in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1272.

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Date of creation: Oct 1999
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1272

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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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  1. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 1226, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Mertens, J.-F. & Neyman, A., . "Stochastic games," CORE Discussion Papers RP -454, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Solan, Eilon, 2000. "Absorbing Team Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 245-261, May.
  5. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
  6. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
  7. Vrieze, O J & Thuijsman, F, 1989. "On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 293-310.
  8. Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad, 2001. "Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1124, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Janos Flesch & Frank Thuijsman & Koos Vrieze, 1997. "Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 303-314.
  10. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Quitting Games," Discussion Papers 1227, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by:
  1. VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon, 2001. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Les Cahiers de Recherche 760, HEC Paris.

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