Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Solan, Eilon
  • Vieille, Nicolas

Abstract

A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff. We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game terminates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than one. We prove that a subgame-perfect e-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. If the game is not degenerate this e-equilibrium is actually in pure strategies.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBY-487DPT8-2/2/a6015092a14be068e7d173a052f84b10
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 39 (2003)
Issue (Month): 8 (November)
Pages: 911-929

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:39:y:2003:i:8:p:911-929

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Quitting Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1227, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Working Papers, HAL hal-00242999, HAL.
  3. Mertens, J.-F., 1986. "Repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1999. "Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1258, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Fine, Charles H. & Li, Lode, 1989. "Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 40-59, March.
  7. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Quitting games - An example," Working Papers, HAL hal-00242995, HAL.
  8. Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan, 2002. "Two Player Non Zero-Sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1347, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2001. "Quitting Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/6017, Paris Dauphine University.
  10. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
  11. Eilon Solan, 2002. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1356, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Janos Flesch & Frank Thuijsman & Koos Vrieze, 1997. "Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 303-314.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, 2014. "Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 89-135, February.
  2. Flesch, János & Kuipers, Jeroen & Schoenmakers, Gijs & Vrieze, Koos, 2008. "Subgame-Perfection in Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Recursive Payoffs," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Flesch J. & Kuipers J. & Schoenmakers G. & Vrieze K., 2011. "Subgame-Perfection in Free Transition Games," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  4. Kuipers, Jeroen & Flesch, Janos & Schoenmakers, Gijs & Vrieze, Koos, 2008. "Pure Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Free Transition Games," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Flesch János & Kuipers Jeroen & Mashiah-Yaakovi Ayala & Schoenmakers Gijs & Solan Eilon & Vrieze Koos, 2010. "Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  6. Yuri Kifer, 2012. "Dynkin Games and Israeli Options," Papers 1209.1791, arXiv.org.
  7. Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, 2009. "Periodic stopping games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 169-181, June.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:39:y:2003:i:8:p:911-929. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.