Equilibrium in Two-Player Nonzero-Sum Dynkin Games in Continuous Time
AbstractWe prove that every two-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time admits an "epsilon" equilibrium in randomized stopping times. We provide a condition that ensures the existence of an "epsilon" equilibrium in nonrandomized stopping times.
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Date of creation: 19 Nov 2012
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Dynkin games; stopping games; equilibrium; stochastic analysis; continuous time.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-12-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-12-06 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-12-06 (Microeconomics)
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