An Application of Ramsey Theorem to Stopping Games
AbstractWe prove that every two-player non zero-sum deterministic stopping game with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an e-equilibrium, for every e>0. The proof uses Ramsey Theorem that states that for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete infinite subgraph which is monochromatic.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1323.
Date of creation: Jul 2001
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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Other versions of this item:
- Shmaya, Eran & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 300-306, February.
- VIEILLE, Nicolas & SHMAYA, Eran & SOLAN, Eilon, 2001. "An Application of Ramsey Theorem to stopping Games," Les Cahiers de Recherche 746, HEC Paris.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-09-26 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2001. "Quitting Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6017, Paris Dauphine University.
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- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002.
"Stopping games: recent results,"
- Flesch, János & Kuipers, Jeroen & Schoenmakers, Gijs & Vrieze, Koos, 2008. "Subgame-Perfection in Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Recursive Payoffs," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Eilon Solan, 2002. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Discussion Papers 1356, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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