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Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

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  • Ramsey, David M.
  • Szajowski, Krzysztof

Abstract

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, International Conference in Memory of Jerzy Łoś (1920 - 1998), Warsaw, September 2004. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 19870.

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Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision: 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19870

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Related research

Keywords: correlated equilibria; Nash equilibria; non-zero sum game; secretary problem;

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  1. Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Potters, J.A.M., 1999. "On the Structure of the Set of Correlated Equilibria in Two-by-Two Bimatrix Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1999-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Stein, William E. & Seale, Darryl A. & Rapoport, Amnon, 2003. "Analysis of heuristic solutions to the best choice problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 151(1), pages 140-152, November.
  3. David M., Ramsey & Krzysztof, Szajowski, 2000. "Bilateral Approach to the Secretary Problem," MPRA Paper 19888, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2003.
  4. F. Forges, 2010. "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 516, David K. Levine.
  5. Seale, Darryl A. & Rapoport, Amnon, 1997. "Sequential Decision Making with Relative Ranks: An Experimental Investigation of the "Secretary Problem">," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 221-236, March.
  6. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
  7. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  8. Hak Chun, Young, 1996. "Selecting the best choice in the weighted secretary problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 135-147, July.
  9. Chun, Young H., 1999. "Selecting the best choice in the full information group interview problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 635-651, December.
  10. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 362-399, February.
  11. Gerard-Varet, L. A. & Moulin, H., 1978. "Correlation and duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 123-149, October.
  12. Eilon Solan, 2001. "Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 259-277.
  13. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/6019, Paris Dauphine University.
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