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Collusion dans les enchères. Quelques apports des jeux coopératifs

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  • Riham Barbar
  • Françoise Forges

Abstract

We consider the second price sealed bid auction of an object that the potential buyers value privately and independently. We show that a cartel?s ex ante optimum, subject to incentive compatility and ex post balanced transfers, coincides with the first best and defines a supermodular characteristic function. By using two standard solution concepts, the core and the Shapley value, we show, among other properties, that every cartel is stable and that bidders gain in forming cartels whose size is as large as possible. We illustrate the difficulties to extend our results in the context of common values. Classification JEL : C71, D44.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 58 (2007)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 965-984

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_585_0965

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Cited by:
  1. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise, November.
  2. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," MPRA Paper 32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Françoise Forges & Ram Orzach, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values," Working Papers 2010.119, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.

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