Collusion dans les enchères. Quelques apports des jeux coopératifs
AbstractWe consider the second price sealed bid auction of an object that the potential buyers value privately and independently. We show that a cartel?s ex ante optimum, subject to incentive compatility and ex post balanced transfers, coincides with the first best and defines a supermodular characteristic function. By using two standard solution concepts, the core and the Shapley value, we show, among other properties, that every cartel is stable and that bidders gain in forming cartels whose size is as large as possible. We illustrate the difficulties to extend our results in the context of common values. Classification JEL : C71, D44.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 58 (2007)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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- Forges, Françoise & Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4100, Paris Dauphine University.
- repec:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/7891 is not listed on IDEAS
- Orzach, Ram & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7891, Paris Dauphine University.
- Biran, Omer, 2011.
"Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities,"
32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Omer Biran, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," Working Papers halshs-00608008, HAL.
- Omer Biran & Francoise Forges, 2010.
"Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3067, CESifo Group Munich.
- Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
- repec:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/7238 is not listed on IDEAS
- Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise, October.
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