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Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach

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  • Zou, Liang

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  • Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:16:y:1992:i:3:p:399-431
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    Cited by:

    1. Zou, Liang & Sun, Laixiang, 2000. "Liability Sharing as a Mechanism to Improve Firms' Investment and Liquidation Decisions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 739-761, December.
    2. Xiaonian Xu & Yan Wang, 1997. "Ownership structure, corporate governance, and corporate performance : the case of Chinese stock companies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1794, The World Bank.
    3. Bodó, Péter, 1996. "Az ügynökprobléma néhány aspektusa az átmeneti gazdaságban [Some aspects of the agent problem in the transition economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 342-349.

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