A Nonparametric Test of Strategic Behavior in the Cournot Model
AbstractWe devise a nonparametric test of strategic behavior in a multiproduct Cournot oligopoly. It is assumed that firms have cost functions that do not change over the period of observation but that market demand can change in each period. Market prices and firm-specific production quantities are observed and it is assumed that neither the inverse demand functions nor the cost functions are known. The driving assumptions of the test are that market inverse demand functions are decreasing and differentiable at each period and that cost functions are increasing and convex for each firm. Under these very general conditions, we show that this test imposes strong restrictions on observed data. We apply the test to the crude oil market and find that strategic behavior is strongly rejected.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16560.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Competitive behavior; Multiproduct Cournot oligopoly; Nonparametric test; Crude oil market; OPEC.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-08-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2009-08-16 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-ENE-2009-08-16 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-IND-2009-08-16 (Industrial Organization)
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