Ex Post Individually Rational Trading Mechanisms
AbstractWe model the trading possibilities of one seller and n potential buyers as a strategic game, which extends the two-person sealed-bid double auction. We introduce particular communication equilibria for this game, the self-fulfilling equilibria. In the case of arbitrary informational externalities, we show that self-fulfilling equilibria are euqivalent to veto-incentive compatible mechanisms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 9810.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
GAMES ; TRADE;
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- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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- Hannu Vartiainen, 2009.
"Auction Design without Commitment,"
44, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Stefano Galavotti & Nozomu Muto & Daisuke Oyama, 2011. "On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 87-123, September.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009.
"Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 182-206, February.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2006. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000085, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
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