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Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d’allocation centralisée

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  • Thierry Magnac

Abstract

We review recent articles that focus on developing structural empirical methods to estimate the preferences of agents, students and universities, or students and schools, who participate in centralized allocation mechanisms.?This empirical research endeavors, first of all, to confirm or invalidate the hypotheses and predictions of the theoretical models developed in the last twenty years.?It also allows for concrete analyzes of existing mechanisms, by estimating the counterfactual impact of changes in the mechanisms used and by comparing between various mechanisms.?Finally, they lead to arguments and conditions of application that justify the use of such or such mechanisms. Classification JEL : C18, C57, D47, D82, I21.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Magnac, 2018. "Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d’allocation centralisée," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(5), pages 683-708.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_695_0683
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    education; matching; mechanism design; applied econometrics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General
    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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