Enjeux stratégiques du concours de recrutement des enseignants-chercheurs
AbstractContrary to most countries, the recruitment of assistant professors in France is centralized: recruitment committees submit a ranking of candidates to the Ministry of Education, the candidates submit their own ranking over the faculties that rank them and the Ministry compute the final match accordingly to these lists. The strategic issues of this procedure are not well known in France. We show that the procedure satisfies desirable properties of stability and optimality. To do so, we identify the matching rule used by the Ministry using the information available to the candidates. The structure of the algorithm that produces the final match is also analyzed. Finally, we discuss the existence of ranking quotas, new features of the next campaign of recruitment and their relationships with job mobility. Classification JEL : C78, C62, J41.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): Volume 61 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2010. "Enjeux stratégiques du concours de recrutement des enseignants chercheurs," Post-Print hal-00703546, HAL.
- Iehlé, Vincent & Haeringer, Guillaume, 2010. "Enjeux stratégiques du concours de recrutement des enseignants chercheurs," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/9617, Paris Dauphine University.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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