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The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont

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  • Daniel McFadden

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 13 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 77-100

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:77-100

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Related research

Keywords: Mechanism_design; Principal-agent_problem; Incentives; Agent_compliance; D000; D600; D610; D710; D800; C420; C700;

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References

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