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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

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  • Caterina Calsamiglia
  • Guillaume Haeringer
  • Flip Klijn

Abstract

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools play an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 365.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:365

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Related research

Keywords: school choice; matching; experiment; Gale-Shapley; top trading cycles; Boston mechanism; efficiency; stability; truncation; truthtelling; safety school;

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References

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  9. Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Constrained School Choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 671.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Dec 2008.
  10. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
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