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A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol

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  • Forgó, Ferenc
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    Abstract

    A new correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called "soft" correlated equilibrium) is introduced for finite games. After randomization over the outcome space, players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of an umpire blindly or freely choose some other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-better outcomes than the simple extension introduced by [Moulin, H., Vial, J.-P., 1978. Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. International Journal of Game Theory 7, 201-221]. The informational and interpretational aspects of soft correlated equilibria are also discussed in detail. The power of the generalization is illustrated in the prisoners's dilemma and a congestion game.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

    Volume (Year): 60 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (November)
    Pages: 186-190

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:3:p:186-190

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

    Related research

    Keywords: Correlation Nash equilibrium Protocol;

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    1. F. Forges, 2010. "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 516, David K. Levine.
    2. Cason, Timothy N. & Sharma, Tridib, 2006. "Recommended Play and Correlated Equilibria: An Experimental Study," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1191, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    3. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    4. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," CORE Discussion Papers 1993009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
    7. Young, H. Peyton, 2004. "Strategic Learning and its Limits," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269181, September.
    8. Forgo, Ferenc & Fulop, Janos & Prill, Maria, 2005. "Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(1), pages 252-267, January.
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