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Citations of
Jeffrey C. Ely

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

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Working papers

  1. Jeffrey C Ely & Marcin Peski, 2008. "Critical Types," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001935, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Yi-Chun Chen & Alfredo Di Tillio & Eduardo Faingold & Siyang Xiong, 2009. "Uniform Topologies on Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1734, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]

  2. Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1575, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000355, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1575R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
    • Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Common Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]

    Published as:
    • Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2008. "Common Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 909-933, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Communication Can Destroy Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-330, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Amil Dasgupta & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning," Working Papers tecipa-301, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Muhamet Yildiz, 2006. "Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World," NBER Working Papers 12648, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Antonio Penta, 2008. "On the Structure of Rationalizability for Arbitrary Spaces of Uncertainty," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 05 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
    4. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Faruk Gul, 2007. "The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000345, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    7. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  4. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro, 2005. "Media Bias and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 11664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Dekel, Eddie & Ely, Jeffrey & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Evolution of Preferences," Micro Theory Working Papers dekel-04-08-13-01-21-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Robertas Zubrickas, 2009. "How Exposure to Markets Can Favor Inequity Averse Preferences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000193, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    2. William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 637-679, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Siegfried Berninghaus & Christian Korth & Stefan Napel, 2007. "Reciprocity—an indirect evolutionary analysis," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 579-603, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    4. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Hans K. Hvide, 2000. "Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0163, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Dietrich, Franz, 2008. "Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework," Research Memoranda 045, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    7. B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran & Robert Oxoby, 2009. "'Us' and 'Them': The Origin of Identity, and its Economic Implications," Working Papers 2009-03, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 01 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
    8. Werner Güth & Stefan Napel, . "Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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    9. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004. "What to Maximize if You Must," Discussion Papers 1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    10. Robertas Zubrickas, 2009. "How Exposure to Markets Can Favor Inequity-Averse Preferences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000130, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    11. Eyal Winter & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Jose Mendez-Naya & Luciano Mendez-Naya, 2009. "Mental Equilibrium and Rational Emotions," Discussion Paper Series dp521, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
    12. Possajennikov, Alex, 2002. "Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in Symmetric Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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    13. Nabil Al-Najjar & Sandeep Baliga & David Besanko, 2005. "The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000496, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    14. Aviad Heifetz & Ella Segev & Eric Talley, . "Market Design with Endogenous Preferences," University of Southern California Legal Working Paper Series usclwps-1001, University of Southern California Law School. [Downloadable!]
    15. Possajennikov, Alex, 2002. "Cooperative Prisoners and Aggressive Chickens: Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in 2x2 Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    16. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2007. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 251-286, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    17. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 1269, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

  6. Jeff Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000064, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001242, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Narayana Kocherlakota & Christopher Phelan, 2007. "On the Robustness of Laissez-Faire," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000165, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series dp350, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Felix Bierbrauer, 2006. "Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy," Discussion Papers 97, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    5. Lixin Ye, 2004. "Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609RR, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Haan, M. A. & Heijnen, P. & Schoonbeek, L. & Toolsema, L. A., 2008. "Sound taxation? On the use of self-declared value," CeNDEF Working Papers 08-02, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
    8. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000548, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    9. Felix Bierbrauer, 2005. "Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    10. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    11. Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2007. "On Robust Constitution Design," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 241-279, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    12. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    13. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Papers 159, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]

  7. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000367, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Ichiro Obara, . "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    4. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    5. LOVO, Stefano & HÖRNER, Johanes, 2006. "Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 845, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    6. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    8. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Discussion Papers 0405-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    10. Wojciech Olszewski, 2007. "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(58), pages 1-16. [Downloadable!]
    11. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    12. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  8. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2002. "Local Conventions," Discussion Papers 1349, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Salomonsson, Marcus, 2009. "Group Selection: The quest for social preferences," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 712, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Zekeriya Eser & Joe Peek, 2006. "Reciprocity and Network Coordination: Evidence from Japanese Banks," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-157, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
    3. Kevin Hasker, 2004. "The Emergent Seed : Simplifying the Analysis of Dynamic Evolution," Departmental Working Papers 0406, Bilkent University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. In Ho Lee & Adam Szeidl & Akos Valentinyi, 2003. "Contagion and State Dependent Mutations," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
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    5. Michael Kosfeld, . "Network Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp152, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]

  9. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1339, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 142, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001242, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2005. "Robustly collusion-proof implementation," Discussion Papers 0506-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Susan Athey & David Miller, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    6. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000548, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. Tilman M. Börgers & Timothy McQuade, 2007. "Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]
    8. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2008. "Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 469-490, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  10. Jeffrey Ely & Jusso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000514, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Discussion Papers 1348, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Jullien, Bruno & Park, In-Uck, 2009. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," IDEI Working Papers 564, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    3. Michael Smart & Daniel M. Sturm, 2006. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEP Discussion Papers dp0770, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Iconio Garrì, 2008. "Politician's Reputation and Policy (Un)persistence," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0851, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE). [Downloadable!]
    5. George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Lan Shi & Christina Tapia, 2009. "The Disciplining Effect of Concern for Referrals for Better Informed Agents: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions," Working Papers UWEC-2009-06, University of Washington, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    7. Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 177-189, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    8. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    9. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    10. Robert S. Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2008. "Remain Silent and Ye Shall Suffer: Seller Exploitation of Reticent Buyers in an Experimental Reputation System," Department of Economics Working Papers 2008-22, Department of Economics, Williams College. [Downloadable!]
    11. Phongthorn Wrasai & Otto H. Swank, 2004. "Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 09 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
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    12. Robert Gazzale, 2005. "Giving Gossips Their Due: Information Provision in Games with Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 0508002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    13. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Discussion Papers 1332, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005. "Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret," Economics Working Papers ECO2005/10, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
    2. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge," Discussion Papers 1324, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1527R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Ashraf-Ball, Hezlin & Oswald, Andrew J. & Oswald, James I., 2009. "Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 903, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    6. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra, 2005. "Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth," Microeconomics 0504008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

  12. Jeffery C. Ely & William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Evolution with Diverse Preferences," Discussion Papers 1317, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Federico Echenique & Aaron Edlin, 2002. "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1037, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Jeffrey Ely, 2000. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0210, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2003. "Repeated Games with Observation Costs," Discussion Papers 0203-14, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Ichiro Obara, . "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    4. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan, 2008. "A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification," CEPR Discussion Papers 6805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    5. Michihiro Kandori, 2006. "Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-395, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    6. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Mechanism design with tacit collusion," Discussion Papers 0102-68, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    7. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    8. Ichiro Obara, . "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case," CARESS Working Papres 99-13, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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    9. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    10. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    11. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    12. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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    13. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    14. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    15. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    16. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    17. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    18. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    19. Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Optimal Repeated Auction with Tacit Collusion (joint with Atila Abdulkadiroglu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000093, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    20. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    21. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Discussion Papers 0405-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    22. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    23. Wojciech Olszewski, 2007. "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(58), pages 1-16. [Downloadable!]
    24. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    25. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    26. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    27. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000342, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    28. V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, . "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    29. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    30. Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    31. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    32. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

  14. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1313, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001194, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609RR, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  15. Jeffrey C. Ely & Okan Yilankaya, 1997. "Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences," Discussion Papers 1191, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Robertas Zubrickas, 2009. "How Exposure to Markets Can Favor Inequity Averse Preferences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000193, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    2. Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Game Theory and Information 0412005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Josef Hofbauer & Jörg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 2005. "Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse38_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 637-679, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    5. Thomas Norman, 2004. "Dynamically Stable Preferences," Economics Series Working Papers 207, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    6. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran & Robert Oxoby, 2009. "'Us' and 'Them': The Origin of Identity, and its Economic Implications," Working Papers 2009-03, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 01 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
    8. Werner Güth & Stefan Napel, . "Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004. "What to Maximize if You Must," Discussion Papers 1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    10. Poulsen, Anders, 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Working Papers 01-3, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    11. Robertas Zubrickas, 2009. "How Exposure to Markets Can Favor Inequity-Averse Preferences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000130, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    12. Possajennikov, Alex, 2002. "Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in Symmetric Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    13. Kenichi Amaya, 2006. "Two-Speed Evolution with Pre-Play Communication and Limited Flexibility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 310-325, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    14. Burkhard Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games," Discussion Papers in Economics 05_05, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    15. Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2003. "Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2003, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    16. Possajennikov, A., 1999. "On evolutionary stability of spiteful preferences," Discussion Paper 56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    17. Aviad Heifetz & Ella Segev & Eric Talley, . "Market Design with Endogenous Preferences," University of Southern California Legal Working Paper Series usclwps-1001, University of Southern California Law School. [Downloadable!]
    18. Sven von Widekind, 2005. "Evolution of non-expected utility preferences," Working Papers 370, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    19. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2002. "Equilibrium Vengeance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    20. Possajennikov, Alex, 2002. "Cooperative Prisoners and Aggressive Chickens: Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in 2x2 Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    21. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2006. "Altruism and Climate," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 643, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    22. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2007. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 251-286, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    23. Lars P. Koch, 2008. "Persistent ideologies in an evolutionary setting," Working Papers 402, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2008. "Common Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 909-933, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  3. Kim-Sau Chung & J.C. Ely, 2007. "Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(2), pages 447-476, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  4. Eddie Dekel & Jeffrey C. Ely & Okan Yilankaya, 2007. "Evolution of Preferences," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(3), pages 685-704, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  5. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  6. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 83-109, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

  7. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 377-415, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  8. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, 2003. "Bad Reputation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 785-814, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  9. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  10. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  11. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 255-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

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