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Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence

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Author Info

  • Martin W. Cripps

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University College London)

  • Jeffrey C. Ely

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Northwestern University)

  • George J. Mailath

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Larry Samuelson

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Yale University)

Abstract

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically distributed across time (but not necessarily across agents), the answer is yes (Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson, 2008). This paper explores the implications of allowing the signals to be dependent over time. We present a counterexample showing that even extremely simple time dependence can preclude common learning, and present sufficient conditions for common learning.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 11-012.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 11 May 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:11-012

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Keywords: Common learning; common belief; private signals; private beliefs;

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  1. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
  2. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-389, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  3. Stephen Morris, 1999. "Approximate common knowledge revisited," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 385-408.
  4. Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2008. "Common Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 909-933, 07.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June.
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