The role of fairness motives and spatial considerations in explaining departures from Nash equilibrium: stationary and evolutionary lessons from 2x2 games
AbstractSubstantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts which perform better empirically, often by introducing a reference point to which players compare the available payoff allocations, as in impulse balance equilibrium and in the inequity aversion model. The first part of this paper is concerned with reviewing the recent reference point literature and advancing a new, empirically sound, hybrid concept. In the second part, evolutionary game theoretic models are employed to investigate the role played by fairness motives as well as spatial structure in explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9252.
Date of creation: 20 Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Other-regarding preferences; Inequity aversion; Endogenous preferences; Evolutionary stability; Prisoner’s dilemma;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-06-27 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2008-06-27 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-06-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-06-27 (Game Theory)
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