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On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information

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  • Amann, Erwin
  • Possajennikov, Alex

Abstract

In an interaction it is possible that one agent has features it is aware of but the opponent is not. These features (e.g. cost, valuation or fighting ability) are referred to as the agent's type. The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric situations of this kind. In one model the type of an agent is fixed and evolution works on strategies of types. In the other model every agent adopts with fixed probabilities both types, and type-contingent strategies are exposed to evolution. It is shown that the dynamic stability properties of equilibria may differ even when there are only two types and two strategies. However, in this case the dynamic stability properties are generically the same when the payoff of a player does not depend directly on the type of the opponent. Examples illustrating these results are provided.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 58 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 310-321

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:3:p:310-321

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

Related research

Keywords: Incomplete information games Evolution Replicator dynamic Dynamic stability;

References

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  1. Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, January.
  2. K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
  3. Chamberland, Marc & Cressman, Ross, 2000. "An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 319-326, February.
  4. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 83-109, October.
  5. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
  6. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
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