Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game
AbstractThe literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a twopopulation example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 397.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2012. "Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game," Working Papers 2012-033, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- David K Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2011. "Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000177, David K. Levine.
- Federico Weinschelbaum & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Felipe Zurita, 2010. "Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game," Working Papers 109, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Aug 2011.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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