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Common Learning

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Author Info

  • Martin W. Cripps

    (University College and Washington University, St. Louis)

  • Jeffrey C. Ely

    (Northwestern University)

  • George J. Mailath

    (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

  • Larry Samuelson

    (University of Wisconsin)

Abstract

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily agents. Does it follow that the agents will commonly learn its value, i.e., that the true value of the parameter will become (approximate) common-knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative when each agent's signal space is finite and show by example that common learning can fail when observations come from a countably infinite signal space.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d15b/d1575.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1575.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Econometrics (2008), 76(4): 909-933
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1575

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

Related research

Keywords: Common learning; Common belief; Private signals; Private beliefs;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
  2. Martin W. Cripps & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2004.
  3. Stephen Morris, . ""Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited''," CARESS Working Papres 96-06, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  4. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
  5. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, 03.
  6. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June.
  8. Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Muhamet Yildiz, 2006. "Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World," NBER Working Papers 12648, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Muhamet Yildiz, 2006. "Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World," NBER Working Papers 12648, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Discussion Papers 1484, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011. "Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 3-49, March.
  4. Amil Dasgupta & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning," Working Papers tecipa-301, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
  6. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Communication Can Destroy Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-330, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  7. Martin Cripps & Jeffrey Ely & George Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Common learning with intertemporal dependence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 55-98, February.
  8. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
  9. Chong Huang, 2011. "Coordination and Social Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  10. Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2012. "Dynamic coordination with individual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 83-101.

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