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Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

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  • Martin Cripps
  • George J. Mailath
  • Larry Samuelson

Abstract

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player’s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that reputations disappear in sufficiently long discounted finitely-repeated games.

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000086.

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Date of creation: 09 Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000086

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References

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  1. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
  2. Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000060, David K. Levine.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January.
  5. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 627, David K. Levine.
  6. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
  7. HART, Sergiu, . "Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -636, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department a3e3219aee004bd237f8112f9, Penn Economics Department.
  9. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Games and Equilibria," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 875, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Cole, Harold L & Dow, James & English, William B, 1995. "Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 365-85, May.
  11. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation? Erratum," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 714, July.
  12. Marco Celentani, 1993. "Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1075R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Christopher Phelan, 2001. "Public trust and government betrayal," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 283, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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Cited by:
  1. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1575R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2007.
  3. Kiridaran Kanagaretnam & Stuart Mestelman & S.M.Khalid Nainar & Mohamed Shehata, 2009. "Trust and Reciprocity with Transparency and Repeated Interactions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-03, McMaster University.
  4. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  5. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
  6. Guillermo Ordonez, 2008. "Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002250, David K. Levine.
  7. Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000304, David K. Levine.
  8. Miriam Schütte & Philipp Christoph Wichardt, 2013. "Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4193, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Guillermo Ordonez, 2005. "Don't Ask Why Things Went Wrong: Nested Reputation and Scapegoating Inefficiency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000988, David K. Levine.
  10. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.

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