Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games
Abstract
Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players-reaction to it.Download Info
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20443.Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20443
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Related research
Keywords: Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Folk Theorem;Other versions of this item:
- Markus Kinateder, 2013. "Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 283-294, February.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-02-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-02-20 (Game Theory)
References
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CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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