Communication Can Destroy Common Learning
AbstractWe show by example that communication can generate a failure of common knowledge acquisition. In the absence of communication, agents acquire approximate common knowledge of some parameter, but with communication they do not.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-330.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 27 Aug 2008
Date of revision:
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Common knowledge; communication;
Other versions of this item:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-08-31 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-KNM-2008-08-31 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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