We show by example that communication can generate a failure of common knowledge acquisition. In the absence of communication, agents acquire approximate common knowledge of some parameter, but with communication they do not.
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Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2008.
"Common Learning,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 909-933, 07.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006.
"Common Learning,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000355, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006.
"Common Learning,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1575R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jun 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2007.
"Common Learning,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
07-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
[Downloadable!]